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Abstract 
It would seem important that jury instructions are clear and comprehensible to jurors if they 
are to effectively carry out their responsibility in criminal trials. Research suggests, however, 
that jurors may not fully understand instructions despite reporting high levels of 
comprehension. The current study (N = 33) surveyed jurors who had recently served on a jury 
to assess their level of comprehension and the factors that contributed to their decisions. It 
was found that a substantial proportion of jurors were mistaken about directions relating to 
beyond reasonable doubt and burden of proof. It also was found that higher levels of self-
reported comprehension were associated with self-reported reliance on additional factors to 
arrive at a decision, and a more positive evaluation of the prosecutions’ case. Overall, while 
jurors report that they understand directions, they do not appear to use those directions in 
arriving at a decision. Subjective comprehension appears to be an important factor in 
understanding the effect of directions on jurors.  
 
 
Key words: Jury instructions, instructions, comprehension, application, subjective 
understanding. 
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Introduction 
Jurors’ abilities to comprehend judges’ instructions have been questioned since the 
earliest use of juries in justice systems (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000). Likewise, 
comprehension of instructions has been an early focus for researchers. Initially, the focus was 
on rewriting instructions so that they were easier to understand (Charrow & Charrow, 1979), 
and a number of other reforms have been suggested since then (e.g., use of audio-visual 
presentation, Brewer, Harvey, & Semmler, 2004). While early calls for reform did not see 
much uptake by judges and reform commissions (Tanford, 1991), there has been renewed 
interest in improving jurors’ comprehension of judicial instructions. For example, several law 
reform commissions in Australia have spent the last few years examining the simplification 
and legal correctness of instructions (NSWLRC, 2012; QLRC, 2009a, 2009b; VCLR, 2009), 
and in the US, states like Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware and others have taken steps 
to remove legalistic jargon from jury instructions (e.g., Dann & Logan, 1996; Marder 2006; 
Tiersma, 2001). The assumption underlying the focus on simplification is that the 
simplification of judicial instructions leads to better application of the law through improved 
comprehension of that law. Many of the suggested reforms to improve comprehension may 
have an unintended consequence--they may increase subjective comprehension at the same 
time as actual comprehension. This study examines the effect of subjective comprehension on 
jurors’ decisions. 
The Function of Instructions 
Judicial instructions have a number of purposes. They can be a guide for 
understanding legal concepts, as well as a guide for how to arrive at the legally correct 
decision. Judges also give instructions as a remedy for factors that might otherwise bias 
jurors’ decisions (e.g., pre-trial media exposure, prior criminal history). These purposes are 
not necessarily independent. Instructions also have an additional purpose that stems from the 
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preceding purposes. This purpose is to avoid appeals to higher courts--mis-instruction of the 
jury is often the only basis for appealing a jury’s verdict. Courts are particularly keen to 
minimize the likelihood of a successful appeal because retrials are expensive, create 
additional burden on the court system, and can be traumatic for victims and witnesses. To this 
end, instructions may be written not only for a jury, but also for the judges sitting on a court 
of appeal. Perhaps as a result of this, pattern instructions--those instructions prepared in 
advance for use in multiple trials--have also been characterized as a mindless ritual (Elwork, 
Alfini, & Sales, 1982). Instructions may have become lengthy and make use of complicated 
language, and include matters that are not necessary for the jury to consider (VLRC, 2009). 
Thus, the goal of protecting a verdict from a costly appeal might undermine the other 
purposes of instructions--namely assisting jurors in their decisions and remedying any 
potential bias (Eames, 2007; Neave, 2012). The literature has noted this tension in the 
purposes of instructions for some time. Ideally, instructions should be both legally accurate 
and comprehensible (Severance, Greene, & Loftus, 1984). With this ideal in mind, there has 
been a renewed interest in improving jurors’ comprehension of judicial instructions (Marder, 
2006, Bornstein & Hamm, 2012). 
Comprehension of Instructions 
Early research in this area demonstrated that the use of psycholinguistic principles to 
rewrite instructions improved juror comprehension (e.g., Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977), but 
it has been noted that there has been limited research since then (e.g., Finkel, 2002), 
potentially because it was perceived by practitioners that jurors did not have a problem with 
comprehending instructions (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000; although see Marder, 2006 and 
American Bar Association, 2005 for notable exceptions). Research has consistently shown 
that this is not the case (e.g., Ellsworth, 1989). Sometimes instructed jurors perform the same 
as uninstructed jurors (Reifman, Gusick, & Ellsworth, 1992), suggesting that either 
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comprehension is poor or jurors do not rely on the directions. Comprehension as assessed by 
multiple choice tests is often at chance levels (e.g., Severance et al., 1984; Reifman et al., 
1992). We know that jurors do not always remember, understand, or apply judicial 
instructions correctly (Lieberman & Sales, 2000), deliberation does not improve jurors’ 
comprehension of instructions (Rose & Ogloff, 2001), and that various remedies do work 
(Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork et al., 1982; Semmler & Brewer, 2002; Young, 2003).  
A number of ways to assess jurors’ comprehension of instructions have been 
developed. Much of the early work showing an improvement in comprehension as a function 
of remedies such as simplification have made use of the paraphrase test, which was 
developed by Charrow and Charrow (1979). This test asks jurors to write in their own words 
what they think the instructions mean. It has been criticized, however, as assessing memory 
and not actual comprehension (e.g., Kagehiro, 1990; Severance & Loftus, 1982). Other tests 
of comprehension have been developed, such as multiple-choice questions (e.g., Brewer, 
Harvey, & Semmler, 2004), and also via application (e.g., Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins, & 
O’Brien, 2010; Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Ruva & LeVasseur, 2012). In this latter test, 
researchers look for the impact of instructions on some meaningful outcome. For example, 
instructions to ignore pre-trial publicity should influence verdicts differently when those 
instructions are not understood by jurors compared to when they are understood (and 
compared to when there is no pre-trial publicity). It is argued that such a test might be more 
appropriate because jurors cannot apply an instruction unless they understand it (Rose & 
Ogloff, 2001). While Rose and Ogloff concluded that the application test performed better 
than the paraphrase test, application and comprehension are not necessarily the same thing 
(see McGuire, 1968, 1972). There are potentially other factors outside of actual 
comprehension that will influence application. In addition, the subjective feeling of 
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comprehension may exert an influence on verdicts beyond actual comprehension of judicial 
instructions. 
For understandable reasons, most research has focused on assessing objective 
comprehension of judicial instructions--namely, whether participants or jurors can 
demonstrate that they understand what they were asked to do. Researchers who have made 
use of subjective or self-report measures of comprehension, have generally found that most 
respondents report that they understand the instructions given to them (e.g., Cutler & Hughes, 
2001; Jackson, 1992; Saxton, 1998; Trimboli, 2008; Young, Cameron, & Tinsley, 2001), a 
finding at odds with the literature assessing objective comprehension (e.g., Reifman, Gusick, 
& Ellsworth, 1992). While some researchers have used such a measure for pragmatic reasons 
and acknowledged the limits of self-report for assessing comprehension (e.g., Trimboli, 
2008), self-report comprehension and its effects have not been a focus of study beyond 
highlighting the disconnection between objective and subjective measures (e.g., Saxton, 
1998; Young, Cameron, & Tinsley, 2001). It is notable that Bornstein and Hamm (2012) did 
assess subjective comprehension of a number of instructions, and found that 
simplified/modified instructions made jurors more confident in their verdict in some 
circumstances. The current study examined the possible effect of subjective comprehension 
on jurors’ case-related perceptions, and how increases in subjective comprehension may 
increase tendencies to convict.  
Objective versus Subjective Comprehension 
Research assessing real jurors’ comprehension of judicial instructions appears to have 
arrived at a very different conclusion to the findings of laboratory studies of instruction 
comprehension. In New South Wales (Australia), 94.9% of actual jurors stated that they 
understood the instructions ‘mostly’ or ‘completely’ (Trimboli, 2008). A New Zealand study 
found similar results, with 85% of actual jurors believing that the instructions were clear 
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(LCNZ, 1999). In the United Kingdom, 94% of actual jurors stated that the instructions were 
not difficult to follow (NSWLRC, 2008). Importantly, these findings were based on 
subjective, or self-report, comprehension of judicial instructions. Laboratory research 
assessing jurors’ actual comprehension suggests that jurors may only understand half the 
instructions provided (Reifman, Gusick & Ellsworth, 1992). This disconnect between 
objective and subjective measures of comprehension may suggest that subjective measures 
are relatively inconsequential in understanding comprehension and the relationship between 
instruction complexity and case outcomes.  
The Impact of Subjective Comprehension 
One potential way that subjective understanding of instructions may have an 
important impact on case outcomes is via confidence. A heightened perception that one 
understands the judicial instruction, and therefore the factors to take into account to arrive at 
a verdict, may result in less effortful information processing and more guilty verdicts. To 
understand why, first consider the heuristic systematic model of persuasion (Chaiken, 1980). 
According to this model, there are two modes of information processing--the systematic and 
the heuristic. The systematic mode is more cognitively effortful and the outcome is 
influenced mainly by the content of the information being considered. The heuristic mode is 
less effortful and the outcome is influenced more by decision-related heuristics such as the 
number of arguments presented by the prosecution compared to the defense. While these two 
modes may co-occur and influence each other, there is a preference to conserve cognitive 
resources and so if a decision is possible via the heuristic mode, then limited systematic 
processing will be preferred. The sufficiency principle determines whether systematic 
processing is necessary. The sufficiency principle says that people will exert the amount of 
effort needed to obtain a sufficient degree of confidence that they have satisfactorily 
accomplished their processing goals (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Whether a perceiver has 
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achieved this confidence depends on their sufficiency threshold--the degree of confidence 
that a person aims to reach when making a particular judgment (Chaiken & Eagly, 1993).  
Thus, the subjective experience of understanding judicial instructions may be 
important in its own right. Higher levels of subjective comprehension may result in less 
systematic processing because jurors’ sufficiency threshold is more readily reached through 
the experience of decision-related confidence. This may result in guilty verdicts by making it 
easier for jurors to reach the appropriate standard of proof--typically beyond reasonable 
doubt--through increased decision-confidence and less rigorous information processing. 
Increasing decision confidence should produce more verdicts in line with the prosecution 
case because of the standard of proof required for a guilty verdict. While guilty verdicts are 
made by jurors who are confident beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, not 
guilty verdicts are the result of jurors who thought the defendant was not guilty and jurors 
who thought the defendant might have been guilty (but had some doubts). By raising 
confidence and reducing jurors’ doubts, some of these latter jurors may now support a guilty 
verdict, and so the overall tendency is for increases in confidence to result in more guilty 
verdicts. 
The Current Study 
The current study involved a survey distributed to jurors sitting on trials in the 
Supreme and District courts in Brisbane, Australia over a two-month period in 2009. Jurors 
were asked to reflect on their experiences during the trial, in particular on what they thought 
the instructions relating to beyond reasonable doubt and burden of proof meant. These 
instructions were chosen because they are presented in the same manner in all trials, except 
for infrequent occasions for burden of proof where the burden would reverse for some 
aspects of the evidence. We measured both subjective comprehension and objective 
comprehension, along with how jurors evaluated both the prosecution and defense cases. As 
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we were assessing jurors’ perceptions related to real cases, it was not possible to directly 
assess the individual “verdicts” jurors would have returned, nor their confidence in their 
verdict. In line with previous research, we expected that objective and subjective measures of 
comprehension would be relatively unrelated (H1). We also predicted that increasing levels 
of subjective, but not objective, understanding would be associated with more positive 
evaluations of the prosecution, but not the defense, case (H2) and a greater reliance on factors 
beyond the evidence presented, such as common sense (H3). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fourteen criminal trials held in the Queensland Supreme Court (N = 3) and District 
Court (N = 11) were included in the study. Surveys were provided to 151 jurors (from the 
pool of 168 jurors). Thirty-three jurors completed and returned the survey--a response rate of 
21.85%, that, while modest, was within the range observed for studies involving real jurors 
using a similar methodology (see Frank & Morera, 2012). Due to the relatively small sample 
size and thus limited statistical power, our analyses focused on correlations between the key 
variables rather than more complex analyses--an a priori power analysis suggests that for an 
estimated effect size of r = .50, an N of 46 is required (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009). The final sample of jurors included 17 females and 16 males, with an average age of 
43.30 years. There were 23 jurors who described themselves as professionals, three employed 
in the home, four retired, and two full-time students. In terms of highest educational level, 
fourteen participants indicated that they had a bachelors degree or higher, thirteen had 
completed a diploma, certificate or apprenticeship, five completed secondary school, and one 
had partly completed secondary school. All participating jurors had English as a first 
language.  
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Materials and Procedure 
A 12-page survey was developed in consultation with the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission (QLRC). The questionnaire assessed jurors’ perceptions of various aspects of 
the trial (available at http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/reports/r66_vol_2_Web.PDF). This article 
focuses on the actual comprehension aspect of the survey. The findings of the broader survey 
are reported as part of the QLRC’s Jury Instructions Report (QLRC, 2009). Jurors received 
the survey at the end of selected criminal trials in the Supreme and District Courts in 
Brisbane, Queensland, between August 6 and October 8, 2009. Staff from the Sheriff’s Office 
distributed the surveys. Jurors could either complete the survey at the Courts Complex or 
return the survey via the post, using a reply-paid envelope provided in the survey pack. 
Subjective comprehension. Jurors’ subjective comprehension of the instructions relating to 
burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt was assessed by asking jurors to indicate how 
much they understood burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very much. For example, “To what extent did you understand 
what the Judge said about “beyond reasonable doubt?”  
Objective comprehension. Jurors’ objective comprehension of burden of proof and beyond 
reasonable doubt was assessed by a paraphrase test. Jurors were asked to explain these 
instructions in their own words. For example, “Briefly explain what ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ means.”  
Evaluation of evidence. Jurors’ evaluation of each side of the case was assessed using two 
measures. First, jurors were asked to rate the convincingness of the prosecution and defense 
cases on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very much. For example, “Overall, 
how convincing was the case presented by the prosecution?” Second, jurors were asked to 
rate both the prosecution and defense cases on four 7-point semantic differentials: 
weak/strong; unclear/clear; unpersuasive/persuasive; poorly presented/well-presented. A 
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rating of 7 was more positive while a rating of 1 was more negative. Four out of these five 
items were combined to form two reliable composites for the prosecution and defense cases 
(r = .91). The item relating to clarity was not included in the composite, as it did not reliably 
fit with the other items. Finally, jurors were asked to rate the extent to which seven factors 
(including the prosecution’s evidence, defence’s evidence, judge’s instructions, jurors’ 
morals, jurors’ common sense, what the judge wanted and what the community wanted) 
influenced their verdict on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very much. For 
example, “In trying to reach a decision, how influential were each of the following: The 
instructions given to you by the judge?” 
Results 
Subjective Comprehension  
Overall, jurors reported a high level of understanding of burden of proof (M = 5.97, 
SD = 1.60). Jurors also reported a high level of understanding of beyond reasonable doubt (M 
= 6.64, SD = 0.49). A majority of jurors said that they understood burden of proof (57%) and 
beyond reasonable doubt (66%) very much.  
Objective Comprehension  
A coding scheme was developed by project staff in consultation with staff from the 
Queensland Law Reform Commission. This consisted of agreed definitions for accurate and 
inaccurate responses for the concepts of burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt. 
Jurors’ responses were coded by a rater blind to jurors’ other responses. Staff from the Law 
Reform Commission then reviewed the coding for accuracy. Adjustments were made to the 
coding by consensus.  
Jurors’ explanations of burden of proof were classified as either accurate or inaccurate 
(including no description). An accurate response was consistent with the definition of burden 
of proof--the prosecution has to prove to the jury that the defendant is guilty of the charges 
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(in most cases, the burden reverses in a small number of cases when specific defenses are 
claimed). Responses were coded as inaccurate if there was a clear misunderstanding of the 
instruction, such as describing a shift in the burden to the defendant unless a defense was 
mentioned (1 response), the burden was on the jury to assess the evidence (5 responses), or 
there was no attempt at an answer (7 responses). Overall, 20 out of 33 jurors accurately 
described burden of proof (see Table 1).  
Likewise, jurors’ explanations of beyond reasonable doubt were classified as either 
accurate or inaccurate. A correct response would indicate that as a juror you were to have no 
doubt that was reasonable when reaching a guilty verdict. There is no generally accepted 
alternative explanation in the Queensland jurisdiction, although other jurisdictions (e.g., New 
Zealand) have developed alternative explanations, including the concept of “are you sure?” 
(Young, 2003). Given the difficulties associated with classifying alternative descriptions of 
the concept of beyond reasonable doubt as either accurate or inaccurate, jurors’ explanations 
were categorized according to the following three standards of proof: (1) Balance of 
probabilities, it was more likely than not that the defendant was guilty; (2) 
Minor/unreasonable doubt, there was some doubt that was not reasonable, or no reasonable 
alternative explanation; and (3) No doubt, there was absolutely no doubt at all. There were a 
number of other responses that were classified as describing a reasonable person test 
(involving what a reasonable person would conclude), and there were several responses that 
could not be classified or were missing. Responses that were coded as minor or unreasonable 
doubt were considered to be accurate explanations of beyond reasonable doubt, all other 
responses were categorized as inaccurate.   
Overall, 13 out of 33 jurors accurately described beyond reasonable doubt (see Table 
1). When responses did not center on minor or unreasonable doubt, they tended to require a 
level of proof that was higher than that technically necessary, or a comparable standard of 
Jury instructions 13 
proof based around what a reasonable person would expect. Only 33.33% of jurors accurately 
described both burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt. A further 33.33% of jurors 
described only one of these terms accurately (n = 11) and 33.33% described both the burden 
of proof and beyond reasonable doubt inaccurately (n = 11).  
Relationship between Subjective Comprehension and Objective Comprehension  
Pearson correlation coefficients were used to investigate the relationship between 
jurors’ subjective and objective comprehension of both burden of proof and beyond 
reasonable doubt. The relationship between jurors’ subjective and objective comprehension 
of the instruction on burden of proof was significant, but only moderate (r = .41, p = .02). 
The more jurors said they understood the instruction the more accurate they were when 
describing the meaning of the instruction. Jurors’ subjective understanding accounted for 
approximately 17% of the variation in their objective understanding of the instruction. In 
contrast and consistent with H1, there was no correlation between jurors’ subjective and 
objective comprehension of the instruction on beyond reasonable doubt (r = -.16, p = .36). 
Evaluation of Evidence 
Jurors’ objective comprehension of beyond reasonable doubt was not correlated with 
their evaluation of the prosecution case (r = .02, p = .92); however, it was negatively 
correlated to their evaluation of the defense case (r = -.39, p = .03). Jurors who did not 
understand the legal term beyond reasonable doubt evaluated the defense case more 
positively. Jurors’ subjective comprehension of beyond reasonable doubt was not correlated 
with their evaluation of the defense case (r = -.25, p = .18), but it was positively correlated 
with their evaluation of the prosecution case (r = .42, p = .02). The more jurors felt they 
understood beyond reasonable doubt, the more positively they evaluated the prosecution 
case.  
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Jurors’ objective comprehension of burden of proof was not correlated with their 
evaluation of the prosecution (r = .05, p = .77) or defense case (r = -.23, p = .22). Jurors’ 
subjective comprehension of burden of proof, however, was positively correlated with their 
evaluation of the prosecution case (r = .38, p = .04) and negatively correlated with their 
evaluation of the defense case (r = -.47, p = .01). The more jurors felt they understood 
burden of proof, the more positively they evaluated the prosecution case and the more 
negatively they evaluated the defense case.  
Partial correlations were then conducted to explore the relationship between jurors’ 
subjective comprehension of burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt and their 
evaluation of the prosecution and defense case, after controlling for jurors’ objective 
comprehension (see Table 2). Controlling for jurors’ objective comprehension of beyond 
reasonable doubt only had an effect on the relationship between jurors’ subjective 
comprehension of beyond reasonable doubt and evaluation of the defendant’s case, such that 
this relationship now approached significance. 
Factors Influencing Verdicts 
Next, we analyzed the relationship between both jurors’ subjective and objective 
comprehension of burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt, and their ratings of the 
factors that they reported were influential in their verdicts. As shown in Table 3, jurors’ 
objective comprehension of burden of proof and beyond reasonable doubt was unrelated to 
all but one of the factors reported to be influencing their verdicts (beyond reasonable doubt 
was related to the measure of reliance on the defense case). Jurors’ subjective comprehension 
of beyond reasonable doubt was also not related to their ratings of any of the factors 
influencing their verdicts. Consistent with H2, jurors’ subjective comprehension of burden of 
proof, however, was strongly positively related to jurors’ ratings about the extent to which 
they were influenced by the prosecution case, and negatively related to jurors’ ratings about 
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the extent to which they were influenced by the defense evidence when arriving at their 
verdict. Providing some support for H3, jurors’ reliance on common sense was also strongly 
positively related to their subjective comprehension of burden of proof. Those jurors who 
reported that they had a better understanding of burden of proof said they were more 
influenced by the evidence presented by the prosecution and their own common sense, and 
less influenced by the defense evidence when arriving at a verdict. 
Discussion 
Jurors’ understanding of instructions given to them during the course of a trial has 
received increased attention in recent years. This investigation was conducted in the broader 
context of proposed jury reform in Queensland, Australia (QLRC, 2009a; 2009b) as a result 
of several Australian Law Reform bodies examining the simplification of jury instructions. 
This is an important area for study, as jurors’ comprehension of judicial instructions--or non-
comprehension as the case may be--can impact on courtroom justice. Previous research 
indicates that jurors’ misunderstanding of instructions may lead to greater reliance on more 
confident (though not necessarily more knowledgeable) jurors during deliberation (Elwork & 
Sales, 1985) and reliance on extra-legal evidence during decision-making (Ruva & 
LeVasseur, 2012). This study explored the possible effect of subjective comprehension on 
jurors’ verdicts in actual criminal trials. We focused on the feeling that one understands, 
compared to actually understands, instructions about the burden and standard of proof 
required to reach a verdict. It was predicted that these two measures would be relatively 
unrelated (H1). It was also expected that the subjective experience of understanding judicial 
instructions would lead to a more favorable evaluation of the prosecution case (H2) and a 
poorer consideration of the evidence (H3). The results supported these three predictions. 
While a majority of jurors understood the instruction related to burden of proof, levels 
of understanding for the standard of proof instruction were substantially lower. 
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Misunderstandings of this latter instruction tended to be in the form of requiring a more 
stringent standard of proof--no doubt at all. While this misunderstanding might be less 
problematic for the defendant, it disadvantages the prosecution and discourages victims from 
reporting crimes. Further, it is arguable that to properly carry out their duties as instructed, 
jurors need to correctly understand both the instructions about standard and burden of proof. 
The results suggest that, consistent with other work in this area (e.g., Reifman et al., 1992), 
only one third of jurors objectively understood both instructions. Also consistent with prior 
work (e.g., O’Mara & von Eckartsberg, 1977), levels of objective and subjective 
understanding tended to be weakly related for burden of proof and unrelated for standard of 
proof (H1). For burden of proof, the relationship was such that greater levels of objective 
understanding were related to greater levels of subjective understanding.  
The results were reasonably clear in showing that increases in subjective 
understanding, but not objective understanding, were consistently related to a more favorable 
evaluation of the prosecution case and a more negative evaluation of the defense case (H2). 
There was also one significant relationship for the measures of objective understanding--
consistent with the observation that misunderstandings of beyond reasonable doubt tended to 
be in the direction of a more stringent standard of proof--the less that jurors actually 
understood the standard of proof, the more convincing they believed the defense case to be. 
The findings for the measure of subjective understanding held even when objective 
understanding was controlled for. This suggests that the experience of feeling as though one 
understands exerts an influence on how the case is perceived beyond actual comprehension 
and any relationship between objective and subjective comprehension cannot explain the 
current findings.  
If objective understanding does not account for the effect of subjective understanding, 
what might be the reason for the observed findings? The findings for the factors that were 
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important in jurors’ decisions give some insight into this. The more jurors thought they 
understood the instructions surrounding burden of proof, the more they said they relied on 
common sense (see also Ogloff, 1991). This suggests a less thorough consideration of the 
evidence (H3), and the correlations between subjective understanding of this instruction and 
self-reported reliance on the prosecution evidence and defense evidence are consistent with 
this--higher subjective understanding was associated with a more one-sided consideration of 
the evidence with prosecution evidence being seen as more important and defense evidence 
being seen as less important. While this might be interpreted as being consistent with the 
burden of proof, both sides of the case are relevant for determining whether the prosecution 
has proved their case as the defense evidence might undermine the prosecution case. 
We argued that greater subjective comprehension of instructions might increase 
jurors’ confidence, and therefore increase the chance that they would return a guilty verdict. 
In the current study it was not possible to directly assess verdicts, nor could we measure 
confidence. We did find the expected effects for the measures of how the prosecution and 
defense cases were evaluated. While untested in this research, it is plausible to think that 
evaluating the prosecution more positively and the defense more negatively may result in 
more guilty verdicts. Some research does suggest, however, that continuous probabilistic 
measures of guilt (such as likelihood) and dichotomous verdicts are not necessarily directly 
related to each other (Arkes, Shoots-Reinhard, & Mayes, 2011). Further work is needed to 
more clearly establish the link between subjective understanding and actual verdicts. While 
we did not measure confidence, we did assess jurors’ self-report reliance on a range of 
factors. These findings suggested that increases in subjective understanding was associated 
with a less thorough consideration of the evidence, which would be consistent with jurors 
achieving higher confidence in their decisions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Future work should 
directly assess confidence however, and explore the relationship between confidence, 
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subjective understanding, and verdicts. Future work could also directly manipulate the 
strength of the case to assess the degree to which jurors evaluate the evidence as a function of 
instruction complexity (e.g., McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller, & Terry, 2012). 
Although the current study did not directly manipulate instruction complexity, the 
findings suggest that if instructions are simplified (as proposed by some as a way to increase 
comprehension of instructions), this may have some unintended consequences. The first of 
these is to do with jurors’ confidence in making a decision. When jurors are given more 
simplified instructions, they may feel more confident and so be less likely to scrutinize the 
evidence carefully. While we did not directly test the link between simplification and 
confidence, we did find that higher levels of subjective comprehension were related to a less 
thorough consideration of the evidence (see also Bornstein & Hamm, 2012). Further work is 
needed to more carefully examine the link between simplification and the extent to which 
jurors use more effortful information processing strategies versus relying on heuristics. This 
suggests that reforms aimed at simplifying instructions carried out with the intention of 
improving jury decision-making, may need to employ additional strategies to manage any 
inflated sense of confidence in understanding. This might be achieved by emphasizing a 
motivation to be correct or highlighting the difficulty that people have understanding 
instructions (even if they have been simplified).  
There may also be social consequences associated with not properly understanding 
instructions, or feeling as though you do understand the instructions. Ellwork and Sales 
(1985) identify a number of problems with objective misunderstanding and jury deliberation-
-deliberations are more likely to include “legally inappropriate” topics; more likely to miss 
important points of law; and confusion could upset the jury dynamics, leading to an 
inappropriate influence from some jurors (see Kagehiro, 1990 for a fuller consideration of 
these points). It is also possible that over-confident jurors who misunderstand the instructions 
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might exert a disproportionate influence on jury deliberations, perhaps stifling other 
dissenting (and possibly more correct) interpretations. Rijnbout has highlighted the 
importance of dissent during group decision-making in helping the group to arrive at a 
decision based on a more thorough consideration of the information (Rijnbout & McKimmie, 
2012a, 2012b). Rijnbout also showed that unanimous decision rules, compared to majority 
decision rules, maximize the positive effects of dissent (Rijnbout & McKimmie, in press). 
Thus encouraging jurors’ to consider all viewpoints during deliberation, and structuring their 
task to maximize the effect of dissent through the use of unanimous decision rules, may also 
counter the negative consequences of instruction simplification. 
There are some not insignificant limitations to the current research, and the above 
points are made more with the view of stimulating discussion about the simplification of 
instructions and the role that comprehension plays, rather than making claims about the data 
that would otherwise benefit from further investigation. While some limitations have been 
noted so far, it is also important to note that we only examined a small set of instructions in 
the current research--instructions related to the legal concepts of beyond reasonable doubt 
and burden of proof. Further work is needed to examine these issues across a larger number 
of instructions to establish the extent to which the issues of subjective and objective 
comprehension are generalizable to other instructions. Second, we did not look at the 
processes and content of the deliberation (for obvious practical reasons as the study involved 
actual jurors and those types of enquires are not legally permissible in the jurisdiction that 
this research was conducted in). Further work is necessary to examine the effect of 
instructions on jury deliberations; as to date this has been an under-researched aspect of jury 
decision-making. Finally, in light of the modest response rate and number of participants, and 
the correlational nature of the design, the conclusions drawn from the data should be 
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considered tentative. Further work is obviously needed to explore these ideas more 
systematically and thoroughly.  
While we are not able to make definitive statements about the role of objective 
instruction comprehension and subjective comprehension in jury decision-making, the 
current data suggest that a more careful consideration of the consequences of instruction 
simplification is warranted. It is clear from the current findings that a substantial proportion 
of jurors struggle to understand two of the fundamental directions given to them, thus 
attempts to improve comprehension through simplification are understandable. This research 
suggests that some care is needed, however, to avoid counter-productive outcomes. Namely, 
simplification may lead to increased subjective understanding, which this research suggests is 
associated with a less thorough consideration of the evidence. Although not directly tested in 
the current research, a number of strategies have been suggested to limit any increases in 
subjective understanding while gaining the benefits of improved comprehension through 
simplification of instructions. This research suggests clearly that, rather than consigning 
subjective understanding of instructions to the role of being an imprecise measure of 
objective understanding, subjective understanding should be studied as an influence on 
jurors’ decisions in its own right.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  
Number of jurors describing each instruction accurately or inaccurately. 
  Burden of Proof  
  Inaccurate Accurate Total 
Beyond reasonable doubt Inaccurate 11 9 20 
 Accurate 2 11 13 
 Total 13 20 33 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Partial correlations between subjective comprehension of burden of proof and beyond 
reasonable doubt and ratings of the prosecution and defense cases, controlling for objective 
comprehension.  
Instruction  Evaluation of 
Prosecution’s Case 
Evaluation of  
Defense Case 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt Subjective 
Understanding 
.43* -.34+ 
Burden of proof Subjective 
Understanding 
.39* -.42* 
Note: * p < .05; + p = .06. 
 
